SUMMARY
Why do some states wittingly charge into international conflicts that they ultimately lose? A conventional wisdom holds that such miscalculations occur because, in questions of war and peace, information is scarce and the future unpredictable. This book instead argues that while the "fog of war" is always present in international politics, some states navigate through it better than others. Whether a state is able to avoid miscalculation, however, hinges in part on institutions connecting political leaders and their diplomatic, defense, and intelligence bureaucracies. When these institutions break down, leaders are more prone to fight diplomatic and military battles based on a false hope of victory, in spite of available information forewarning defeat.
The book's empirical analysis offers the first systematic and global account of how these institutions affect interstate conflict, breaking with past studies by broadening the analytical focus beyond Western countries. It draws on a first-of-its-kind dataset on institutions for national security decision-making in over a hundred countries across the world since 1945, as well as in-depth case studies on China, India, Pakistan, and the United States. Relying on systematic archival and interview evidence collected from each country, the cases show just how important these institutions are to explaining numerous strategic blunders, including the Sino-Indian War in 1962, the US escalation in Vietnam in 1965, Pakistan's offensive in Kargil in 1999, and the EP-3 crisis between China and the United States in 2001.
The book's empirical analysis offers the first systematic and global account of how these institutions affect interstate conflict, breaking with past studies by broadening the analytical focus beyond Western countries. It draws on a first-of-its-kind dataset on institutions for national security decision-making in over a hundred countries across the world since 1945, as well as in-depth case studies on China, India, Pakistan, and the United States. Relying on systematic archival and interview evidence collected from each country, the cases show just how important these institutions are to explaining numerous strategic blunders, including the Sino-Indian War in 1962, the US escalation in Vietnam in 1965, Pakistan's offensive in Kargil in 1999, and the EP-3 crisis between China and the United States in 2001.
CHAPTER LIST
- Chapter 1 - Introduction
- Chapter 2 - An Institutional Theory of Miscalculation
- Chapter 3 - The World of National Security Institutions
- Chapter 4 - Personalist Dictatorship: China under Mao
- Chapter 5 - Collectivist Dictatorship: China after Mao
- Chapter 6 - Presidential Democracy: United States
- Chapter 7 - Parliamentary Democracy: India
- Chapter 8 - Military Regimes: Pakistan
- Chapter 9 - Conclusion
DATA
- National Security Institutions Data Set
- PRC Elite Decision-Making Data Set
ARCHIVAL AND INTERVIEW RESEARCH
China
India
Pakistan
United States
United Kingdom
Taiwan
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives - 外交部档案馆, Beijing | Spring 2017
- National Library - 中国国家图书馆, Beijing | Spring 2017
- Peking University Library - 北京大学图书馆, Beijing | Spring 2017
India
- Nehru Memorial Library and Museum, Delhi | Winter 2017
- National Archives of India, Delhi | Winter 2017
Pakistan
- National Library of Pakistan, Islamabad | Fall 2017
- Institute of Strategic Studies Library, Islamabad | Fall 2017
United States
- Richard Nixon Presidential Archives, Yorba Linda | Fall 2019
- Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library | Spring 2019
- John F. Kennedy Presidential Library | Spring 2019
- National Archives and Records Administration, College Park | Fall 2016
- Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, Independence | Fall 2016
- Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene | Fall 2016
- William J. Clinton Presidential Library, Little Rock | Fall 2016
United Kingdom
- The National Archives, London | Winter 2018
- Hoover Institution Archives, Palo Alto | Fall 2017
Taiwan
- Academia Historica - 國史館, Taipei | Summer 2017
- National Archives Administration - 國家發展委員會檔案管理局, Taipei | Summer 2016
Image: Photo of Watercolor by Tanconville, 1911