Tyler Jost
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ARTICLES

CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY | INTERNATIONAL SECURITY | Bureaucracy

Peer-Reviewed Publications

"The Character and Origins of Military Attitudes on the Use of Force" International Studies Quarterly 66:2 (June 2022).
​with Kaine Meshkin and Robert Schub

Do military and civilian attitudes on the use of force differ and, if so, why? Past scholarship is divided not only on whether decision-makers with military experience are more hawkish but also in whether differences stem from organizational selection or socialization. We contribute to these debates through a unique opportunity to survey incoming military officers at the US Military Academy before and after basic training – and pair the results with simultaneous surveys of a nationally representative sample. We find that future military elites are more hawkish than civilians, the gap is evident upon arrival, and initial socializing experiences cannot explain the gap. Numerous tests addressing potential socialization effects over a longer period reveal that experience may attenuate hawkishness but that it is insufficient to offset initial differences. The results indicate that preexisting attitudes shape the groups into which elites select as much as experiences in those groups shape attitudes.

Working Papers

"Authoritarian Advisers: Institutional Origins of Miscalculation in Chinese Foreign Policy" (revise and resubmit at ​International Security)

When is China prone to miscalculate in its foreign policy? As China continues to rise, its strategic choices will have enormous consequences for the world. Many claim that authoritarian countries, such as China, blunder more frequently when personalist dictators amass absolute control but exhibit better judgment when party elites share power. This conventional wisdom, rooted in the idea that accountability among elites produces better decisions, does not explain China’s past pattern of miscalculation. Instead, I argue that China’s propensity for blunder hinges on the institutional relationship between political leaders who make decisions and bureaucratic advisers who inform those decisions. When authoritarian leaders face acute power struggles within the party or lack experience managing national security affairs, political-bureaucratic relationships break down and deprive leaders of the information they need to properly evaluate which strategies will work. These findings have implications for the study of foreign policy decision-making broadly and for the prospects for future miscalculation in Chinese foreign policy specifically.​

"Leaders, Bureaucracy, and Miscalculation in International Crisis" (under review)

When does bureaucracy make states prone to miscalculate in international crisis? International relations scholarship often assumes that bureaucracy increases the propensity for miscalculation, but offers comparatively few insights into what makes bureaucracy in some states more prone to miscalculation than in others. I develop a theory of crisis miscalculation that emphasizes variation in institutional relationships between political leaders and foreign policy bureaucracies. I argue that two dimensions of these institutions – capacity for information search and oversight structure – help explain why some states are more prone to miscalculate than others. To test my argument, I introduce a novel data set that measures these institutional differences across the globe from 1946 to 2015. Contrary to canonical theories that argue that bureaucratic advice undermines strategic judgment, the analysis finds that institutions that integrate bureaucrats into a leader's decision-making process tend to perform better in interstate crises than those that exclude them. The theory and findings improve our understanding of how bureaucracy shapes the crisis behavior of modern states.

"Advisers and Aggregation in Foreign Policy Decision-Making" (under review)
​with Josh Kertzer, Eric Min and Robert Schub

Do advisers affect foreign policy and, if so, how? Recent scholarship on elite decision-making prioritizes leaders and the institutions that surround them, rather than the dispositions of advisers themselves. We argue that despite the hierarchical nature of foreign policy decision-making, advisers' predispositions towards the use of force shape state behavior through participation in deliberations. We test our argument by introducing an original dataset of 2,881 foreign policy deliberations between US presidents and their advisers from 1947 to 1988. Applying a novel machine learning approach to estimate the hawkishness of 1,073 Cold War-era foreign policy decision-makers, we show that adviser-level hawkishness has consistently large effects on foreign policy decisions. Conflictual policy choices grow more likely as hawks increasingly dominate the debate, even when accounting for leader dispositions. These results enrich our understanding of international conflict by demonstrating that advisers' dispositions, which aggregate via deliberation, systematically shape foreign policy.

"Armies and Influence: Public Deference to Foreign Policy Elites" (under review)
with Josh Kertzer

When is the public more likely to defer to elites on foreign policy? Existing research suggests the public takes its cues from co-partisans, but what happens when co-partisans disagree? We argue that the public defers to elites whose prior experiences signal expertise and favorable intentions. Not all types of experience, however, are created equal in the eyes of the public. The public is especially deferential to elites with backgrounds in socially-esteemed institutions, even when the core competencies of those institutions are not directly related to the issue at hand. We test our argument using two conjoint experiments that capture the information-rich environment in which the public must discriminate between cues from many types of elites. We find that the American public defers to more experienced elites generally, but is especially deferential towards elites with experience in trusted institutions. Specifically, our results show that the public defers more to elites with military backgrounds, even when considering non-military issues. The results have important implications for the study of public opinion, bureaucratic politics, and civil-military relations.

"Bureaucracy and Cyber Coercion" (under review)
with Heidi Demarest and Robert Schub

Works in Progress

The Military Origins of Civilian Power in China
with Dan Mattingly

Foreign Policy Information in Authoritarian Regimes: Evidence from China
with Eric Min

Dictatorship and Diplomacy: The Rise (and Fall?) of Professionalism in China's Foreign Ministry

Regime Type, Threat Perception, and Interstate Competition
Supported by the Smith Richardson Foundation

Chinese Diplomatic Exchange Dataset, 1949-2015
with Austin Jordan

Chinese Military Diplomacy
with Austin Strange

Book Chapters

"Autocratic Institutions and Actors," Oxford Handbook of Foreign Policy Analysis


Image:  Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Beijing - 2017
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